Constitutional and legal reforms are needed to address divisions rooted in the over-centralisation of power and resources.
Despite a veneer of national cohesion, deep ethnic and political divisions persist in Sierra Leone. These were evident during the 2023 contested elections, which required a national unity agreement to defuse tensions between the government and the opposition All People’s Congress (APC).
The APC had rejected the declaration of President Julius Maada Bio as the winner, citing irregularities and procedural infractions. While the next general election is still three years away, it’s critical to prevent a resurgence of tensions that could escalate into violence and instability.
Since the end of its civil war in 2002, Sierra Leone has been on a democratic trajectory, holding five consecutive elections and experiencing peaceful transfers of power in 2007 and 2018. The country has consistently ranked high on the Global Peace Index, although with a slight decline since 2016 – and was ranked eighth most peaceful in Africa in 2024.
Combined with its post-war stability, religious tolerance, and conflict prevention awareness, this progress has fostered a semblance of national cohesion and led to reduced regional and international interventions in recent years.
At least 25% of citizens in the south and east claimed their ethnic groups were being treated unfairly
Nevertheless, deep-rooted socio-political cleavages continue and were especially apparent before and after the June 2023 elections. The antagonistic relationship between the ruling Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and APC continues to reflect pronounced ethno-regional cleavages. The SLPP draws its primary support from the Mende ethnic group in the south and east, while the APC is largely backed by the Temne in the north and northwest.
These divisions were implicitly acknowledged in the agreement, in which both parties jointly condemned ‘all citizens at home and abroad who incite violence, spread hate speech and disrupt national cohesion.’ They reaffirmed their commitment to inter-party dialogue.
The agreement aimed to resolve the post-election impasse, leading to the APC ending the boycott of its participation in elective offices – parliamentarians, mayors, council chairs, and councillors. The parties agreed to establish a cross-party committee to review the 2023 electoral process and address issues such as election-related detentions and politically motivated legal actions.
However, it did not address the over-centralisation of power and resources that have historically fuelled divisive politics, often centred more on access to state control than genuine policy differences. The 1991 Constitution (as reinstated in 1996 and amended in 2008) and Mines and Minerals Development Act vest full ownership and control of Sierra Leone’s vast natural resources – including gold, diamonds, bauxite, and iron ore – in the state, particularly the executive.
With 39% of formal jobs in public service, state power remains the main path to economic opportunity
Mining, regulated by the National Minerals Agency, has been a key economic pillar, accounting for over 26% of gross domestic product in 2014 and contributing significantly to public revenue and export earnings between 2012 and 2014 before Ebola and COVID-19 disruptions.
Furthermore, the private sector relies on state-led public works and procurement. The government controls licences, permits, and access to credit guarantees, making proximity to political elites a determinant of economic success.
The public service, accounting for 39% of formal employment in 2018, remains a major employer. These factors reinforce state dominance over economic life and render access to political office a gateway to wealth accumulation, while exclusion often translates into economic marginalisation.
Both major parties have accused each other of corruption and discriminatory economic practices. Between 2007 and 2018, SLPP leaders, including then-opposition figure Bio, accusedthe APC government of tribalism, patronage and nepotism, claiming government contracts were awarded primarily to ruling elite loyalists and associates.
On assuming office in 2018, the Bio administration released a report alleging grand corruption and ethnic favouritism under former president Ernest Bai Koroma. At least 25% of citizens in the south and east claimed their ethnic groups were being treated unfairly.
The APC has similarly accused the SLPP of state capture, citing, for example, the alleged misappropriation of public funds by First Lady Fatima Maada Bio. In its northern stronghold, where 26% of the Temne population reported experiencing ethnic discrimination by the state, grievances over rising living costs and limited access to basic services triggered deadly anti-government protests in August 2022.
These developments echo the causes of the civil war, as identified by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in its 2004 final report. It found that ‘[t]he provinces had almost been totally sidelined through the centralisation of political and economic power in Freetown’ and regions and ethnic groups were polarised by contrasting treatment. Successive governments, the commission concluded, had systematically favoured ‘certain ethnic groups in appointments across the cabinet, the civil service and army.’
The 2023 deal eased tensions but failed to address the root problem: over-centralised power
Despite the 2023 agreement, political tensions intensified when Koroma was placed under house arrest and charged with treason between December 2023 and January 2024 regarding an alleged attempted coup. This followed attacks on military installations and prisons, which left 20 dead and enabled over 2000 prisoners to escape. The government claimed that Koroma’s security personnel largely orchestrated these attacks.
Moreover, the executive wields significant control over state institutions despite constitutional provisions for the separation of powers. Presidential appointments to key government positions – including in the judiciary, security sector, and public administration – concentrate power in the executive and turn public institutions into vehicles for patronage, including through the allocation of public contracts and jobs.
Transitions of power between the SLPP and APC have frequently resulted in widespread replacement of state personnel. Institute for Security Studies (ISS) interviews with political and civil society actors in June 2024 highlighted concerns over the politicisation of public appointments and deployment of state institutions against political opponents.
The trial of APC’s 2023 presidential candidate and former foreign minister Samura Karama for alleged corruption was cited as an example.
Promoting sustainable national cohesion and ensuring stability during elections will require more than externally brokered political settlements. The deal was brokered by the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Commonwealth, and the Independent Commission for Peace and National Cohesion.
Structural reforms aimed at decentralising power and resource control must be prioritised through constitutional and legal reforms. The AU, ECOWAS, and other international partners must go beyond crisis response and work to accelerate inclusive development and expand economic opportunities for all, irrespective of ethnicity or region.
About the Author
Sampson Kwarkye
Project Manager, Littoral West African States, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel
